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371 
MODERN BLASPHEMY LAWS IN PAKISTAN AND 
THE RIMSHA MASIH CASE: WHAT EFFECT—IF 
ANY—THE CASE WILL HAVE ON THEIR 
FUTURE REFORM 
INTRODUCTION 
This Note will examine the current blasphemy laws in Pakistan, with a 
particular focus on the case of Rimsha Masih, who was charged with 
blasphemy in 2012 and ultimately acquitted in 2013. Although Rimsha’s 
case is unprecedented, it is far from a turning point for blasphemy laws in 
Pakistan for two reasons. First, Rimsha’s case was an outlier, as evidenced 
by the unique circumstances of her case, as well as subsequent events that 
reinforce that proposition. Second, the nature of the political-religious-
legal system in Pakistan makes the blasphemy laws and their enforcement 
a far more complicated issue than what occurs in a courtroom can explain. 
The very nature of Pakistan’s governmental, constitutional, and legal 
structure has created an extra-legal system of blasphemy law enforcement 
grounded in traditional notions of Islam and enforced in large part through 
vigilantism. If reform is to be achieved, it is in that arena where it must 
take place. 
Part I provides a brief overview of the case of Rimsha Masih: her arrest 
in September of 2012, acquittal in November, and the subsequent 
confirmation of the acquittal by the Pakistan Supreme Court in January of 
2013. Parts II and III examine the political, legal, and constitutional 
developments within Pakistan that have led to the modern blasphemy 
laws. Part II contains an overview of Pakistani constitutional development 
prior to the Zia ul-Haq regime, with a particular focus on the 1973 
Constitution. Part III focuses on the Zia ul-Haq military regime, which 
began in 1977 and caused Pakistan’s Constitution to undergo major 
changes. Zia, aided by popular support, aggressively and successfully 
Islamicized the laws and constitution of Pakistan, including the addition of 
three amendments now referred to as the blasphemy laws.  
Part V explores how the blasphemy laws have been used since their 
inception and the role they play in Pakistan today. For context, this 
discussion is prefaced by Part IV, which examines how blasphemy laws 
are currently treated around the world. Part V then provides an in-depth 
overview of the current state of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws, identifying 
and explaining several serious problems that result from the current 
application of the blasphemy laws in Pakistan. 
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Part VI argues that vigilantism by Pakistani citizens in response to 
allegations of blasphemy has constrained political reform of the laws and 
usurped the judicial process and rule of law. This includes an argument 
that the inherent tension between Pakistan’s democratic government and 
its Islamicized laws has created an uncertain void of blasphemy law 
enforcement that has been filled by vigilantism and mob violence.  
Part VII explores whether Rimsha’s case marks a turning point toward 
reform for the blasphemy laws or is simply an outlier. Pointing to several 
circumstances that make Rimsha’s case unique, as well as subsequent 
events that have indicated that vigilantism still reigns in the blasphemy 
realm, Part VII will argue that the case is, in fact, an outlier.  
I. THE RIMSHA MASIH CASE 
On August 16, 2012, a fourteen year-old Christian Pakistani girl with 
learning disabilities named Rimsha Masih was arrested and jailed in her 
hometown of Mehrabad on allegations that she had violated Pakistan’s 
strict laws against blasphemy.
1
 She was accused of tearing pages from a 
copy of the Koran and burning them.
2
 That allegation led to angry 
demonstrations by Pakistani Muslims in her predominantly Christian 
neighborhood, with an estimated 600 to 1,000 people turning out in 
protest.
3
 In order to appease the crowd, police took Rimsha into custody. 
Her parents and the rest of the community were forced to flee.
4
 
The case against Rimsha subsequently unfolded in unusual fashion. In 
two unprecedented developments, Rimsha’s accuser, an imam of a nearby 
mosque named Hafiz Mohammed Khalid Chishti, was also charged under 
 
 
 1. Jon Boone, Pakistani Girl Accused of Qur’an Burning Could Face Death Penalty, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2012, 3:25 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/19/pakistan-
christian-tensions-quran-burning-allegations. In the wake of Rimsha’s arrest, there was considerable 
debate about her true age and mental capacity, with those who believed her to be guilty insisting that 
she was older and not cognitively delayed, while her parents insisted that she was “just 11 and has 
Down’s syndrome.” The Blasphemy Law in Pakistan Contemptuous: For Once, the Government 
Pushes Back on Intolerance, ECONOMIST (Sept. 8, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21562262. 
An ordered medical report submitted to the court found her to be around age fourteen with a mental 
age “below her chronological age.” Id. Regardless, there is little dispute that Rimsha is legally a 
juvenile and has at least some type of cognitive or developmental delay. 
 2. Boone, supra note 1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. “The police, initially unwilling to take action, eventually charged the girl with blasphemy 
and took her into custody. The rest of the community, including her parents, fled.” Id. In the days 
following Rimsha’s arrest, those Christians in the neighborhood who had not yet fled were ordered to 
leave: “One of the senior members of the dominant Muslim community told the Christians to remove 
all their belongings from their houses by 1 September.” Id. The few Christians who remained 
following that warning were refused service and water by shopkeepers in the neighborhood. Id. 
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the blasphemy laws for allegedly planting the incriminating evidence,
5
 and 
Rimsha was ultimately acquitted of the charges in November of 2012 by 
the High Court in Islamabad,
6
 a ruling subsequently confirmed by the 
Pakistan Supreme Court.
7
  
II. PAKISTANI CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT PRIOR TO  
THE ZIA UL-HAQ REGIME 
The nation of Pakistan was created in 1947 through the partitioning of 
British India. It was the result of a push by Muslim separatists to establish 
their own independent country.
8
 Muslims account for ninety-seven percent 
of the country’s population.9 Pakistan, as a country formed for the purpose 
of creating a ‘Muslim state’ homeland for the Muslims of British India, 
has necessarily grappled with the role that Islam should play in the 
country.
10
 “The ongoing debate revolves around the question of whether ‘a 
Muslim state’ was merely a country for Muslims or an Islamic state 
governed by the precepts of Shari’a.”11 On one side of the debate stand 
those who believe that a Muslim state can and should be strictly governed 
 
 
 5. Pakistan ‘Koran Plot’ Imam Remanded in Blasphemy Case, BBC NEWS, (Sept. 2, 2012, 8:34 
AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19454739. The imam, Khalid Chishti, was taken into 
custody and charged with blasphemy for allegedly placing the burned Koran pages in Rimsha’s bag as 
a “way of getting rid of Christians.” Id. Witnesses claimed to see Chishti add pages from the actual 
Koran to the bag of ashes. Id. The witnesses who came forward were worshippers at Chishti’s mosque. 
Rob Crilly, Muslim Cleric Arrested in Pakistan Koran-Burning Case, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 2, 2012, 3:06 
PM), http://www. telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/9515586/Muslim-cleric-arrested-in-
Pakistan-Koran-burning-case.html. Many were quick to question the veracity of the witnesses; for 
example, “hardliners” warned of a potential conspiracy and “question[ed] why it ha[d] taken so long 
for the new witness to come forward.” Id. Additionally, the lawyer for the man who made the original 
accusation accused the authorities of interfering in the case and pressuring the witnesses. Id. 
 6. Rimsha Masih v. Station House Officer, Police Station Ramna, Writ Petition No. 3172-
Q/2012, Judgment Sheet (Nov. 14, 2012), available at http://www.ihc.gov.pk/Announcements/ 
Judgements/Court1/W.P.%203172-Q-2012.pdf. See also Pakistan: Blasphemy Case Against Rimsha 
Masih Dismissed, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 20, 2012, 5:24 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2012/11/20/pakistan-blasphemy-case_n_2162850. html. According to Rimsha’s attorney, “the 
Islamabad High Court's decision to throw out the case was based on the fact that no one had seen her 
burning pages of the Koran.” Id. 
 7. Pakistan Supreme Court Confirms Decision to Drop Blasphemy Case, WORLD WATCH 
MONITOR (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2013/01-January/article_2016163. 
html/. The Supreme Court’s decision ended the case definitively; Rimsha’s lead attorney, Tahir 
Naveed Chaudry, stated that “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision has put an end to future contentions on 
the case.” Id.  
 8. MOHAMED ELTAYEB, A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO COMBATING RELIGIOUS 
PERSECUTION: CASES FROM PAKISTAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND SUDAN 55 (2001). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. “Created as a homeland for the Muslims of British India, the role of religion (Islam) has 
been at the centre of Pakistani politics.” Id.  
 11. Id.  
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by the rules of Shari’a law.12 While Pakistan’s constitutional history has 
been turbulent,
13
 the country initially took a more centrist approach in 
regard to this debate, including in the original formulation of its 1973 
Constitution.
14
 However, as a result of the constitutional amendments 
enacted under the military rule of Zia ul-Haq, there has since been a 
deliberate shift toward an increased role for Islam and Shari’a in the law 
and governance of Pakistan.  
The 1973 Pakistan Constitution can be characterized as “Islamic, 
federal and democratic.”15 It established a parliamentary government with 
a federal structure and an independent judiciary
16
 and expressly provided 
for many fundamental rights for its people, including the right to freedom 
 
 
 12. What would such a state look like? Rudolph Peters offers an excellent summary of both the 
mindset behind establishing a Shari’a-dominated state, as well as the practical implications that would 
result in such a scenario:  
It is not sufficient that such a state gives Muslims the choice to follow or not to follow the 
Shari’a; it must actually impose the Shari’a on them, by implementing Islamic criminal law. 
Preaching and admonition do not suffice, and a big stick is needed to change behavior in an 
Islamic direction. Islamic criminal law is a tool to impose an Islamic moral order on society, 
by enforcing rigorous rules, especially in the fields of sexual morality, blasphemy and the 
consumption of alcohol and drugs. 
RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM THE 
SIXTEENTH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 144 (2005). 
 13. Kamal Azfar, Constitutional Dilemmas in Pakistan, in CRAIG BAXTER & SHAHID BURKI, 
PAKISTAN UNDER THE MILITARY: ELEVEN YEARS OF ZIA-UL-HAQ 49 (1991). 
Since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, the nation has persisted through five different 
republics. The Government of India Act of 1935, together with the Indian Independence Act 
of 1947, served as the first republic’s constitution. The second republic began . . . with the 
Constitution of Pakistan of 1956. The second republic came to an end with the proclamation 
of martial law on October 7, 1958, which abrogated the 1956 constitution. The third republic 
. . . [fell] when martial law was imposed on March 25, 1969, by the Commander-in-Chief 
General Yahya Khan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Yahya’s successor as chief martial law 
administrator and president, was the leader of the fourth republic and the author of the 1973 
constitution. Martial law was declared once again by General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, the 
chief of army staff, on July 5, 1977, and was not lifted until 1985. The Revival of the 
Constitution Order of 1985 revived the 1973 constitution with some major amendments and 
marked the beginning of Pakistan’s fifth republic.  
Id. 
 14. While the original 1973 Constitution was indeed a much less Islamicized set of laws than the 
post-Zia Constitution that exists today, Pakistan’s first two (short-lived) constitutions, enacted in 1956 
and 1962 respectively, placed less emphasis on the role of Islam. For example, they did not provide for 
Islam as the state religion, whereas the 1973 Constitution did. “The Constitutions of 1956 and 1962 
did not make any formal declaration to the effect that ‘Islam is the state religion of Pakistan’ . . . 
Article 2 of the Constitution of 1973 has, however, declared Islam to be the State religion of Pakistan 
in categorical terms, which is a clear departure from the previous Constitutions.” HAMID KHAN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF PAKISTAN 895 (2001). 
 15. ELTAYEB, supra note 8, at 59. 
 16. Id.  
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of speech, expression, and press.
17
 This included freedom to establish and 
practice any religion.
18
 In these ways, then, the 1973 Pakistan Constitution 
contained many of the same rights as can be found in the constitutions of 
Western democracies.
19
 
The 1973 Constitution also contained many provisions that signaled the 
important role of Islam in the structure and governance of the state. This 
role would be greatly expanded under Zia, but even before, the 
Constitution contained an inherent tension whereby the democratic state 
was used as an instrument to inject many important aspects of Islam into 
the legal structure of the country.
20
 Among the Islamic provisions 
contained in the Constitution were the following: First, Islam was 
established as the state religion.
21
 Second, no laws were to exist that were 
“repugnant” to Islam.22 Third, the President was charged with establishing 
 
 
 17. KHAN, supra note 14, at 489. These guarantees can be found in article 19 of the Constitution 
of Pakistan, which reads: 
Every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, and there shall be 
freedom of the press, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of 
the glory of Islam or the integrity, security or defence of Pakistan or any part thereof, friendly 
relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of 
court, [commission of] or incitement to an offence. 
PAKISTAN CONST. art. 19. 
 18. KHAN, supra note 14, at 489. “Freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practice, and 
propagate any religion, subject to public order and morality, were guaranteed. Every religious 
association and every sect thereof was guaranteed the right to establish, manage, and maintain its 
religious institutions.” Id. 
 19. The Constitution of the United States, for example, expressly protects these same 
fundamental rights for its citizens, specifically under the 1st Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 20. IHSAN YILMAZ, MUSLIM LAWS, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN MODERN NATION STATES: 
DYNAMIC LEGAL PLURALISMS IN ENGLAND, TURKEY AND PAKISTAN 125 (2005).  
Islam is the foundation of state legitimacy in Pakistan and the state law is used as an 
instrument by the state to serve the purposes of Islamic modern nation-state ideology. Modern 
Pakistani law, despite its constitutional commitment to observe the injunctions of Islam, 
operates on the basis that the state law is the only legal authority. In other words, it follows 
the Western model of political ideology which is characterized by the paradigm of legal 
modernity in the normative realm but tries to match this model with Islamic concepts.  
Id. Another way of conceptualizing the connection between Islam and the 1973 Constitution is that the 
Constitution “has the necessary ingredients for the establishment of religion by the state.” KHAN, 
supra note 14, at 897. The rationale, Khan explains, is simple: “Pakistan was created in the name of 
Islam and, therefore, the establishment of Islam as the state religion under the Constitution is only a 
logical end and objective of its creation.” Id. 
 21. KHAN, supra note 14, at 502. In addition, “[t]he Islamic way of life was to be promoted . . . . 
The Head of State, the President, was to be a Muslim. The Prime Minister was also required to be a 
Muslim member of the National Assembly.” Id. 
 22. Id. Specifically, one provision mandated that “no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to 
the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and the sunnah,” while another required that 
any existing laws also “be brought into conformity with injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy 
Quran and sunnah.” Id. 
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a “Council of Islamic Ideology.”23 While these provisions demonstrated 
the important role of Islam in the governance of Pakistan, they fell short of 
establishing a nation governed expressly by Shari’a law, and were 
balanced by the distinctly democratic guarantees also found in the 
Constitution. 
III. THE ZIA UL-HAQ REGIME AND THE ISLAMIZATION OF PAKISTANI LAW 
The balance of the 1973 Constitution was abandoned in favor of 
increased ‘Islamization’ of Pakistani law during the Zia ul-Haq military 
regime. In July of 1977, Zia, the Army Chief General, used his forces to 
take over administration of the country.
24
 “Martial law was imposed”25 and 
“the Constitution was held in abeyance.”26 The overthrow of the 
government was the culmination of prolonged violent demonstrations by 
various political groups whose common goal was the Islamization of 
Pakistan.
27
 From the outset, Zia’s words and actions also reflected a desire 
to achieve this goal. He espoused strong views regarding the need for 
 
 
 23. Id. The job of this Council was to make recommendations to Parliament and the Provincial 
Assemblies on how best to alter existing laws to bring them into conformity with Islam, and how to 
bring such changes into effect. Id. 
 24. Id. at 579. The President and other leaders were placed under “protective custody.” Id. Zia ul-
Haq was supported in his overthrow efforts by the Islamist organization Jama’at-I Islami. PETERS, 
supra note 12, at 155. 
 25. KHAN, supra note 14, at 579. 
 26. Id. at 580. The legality of the Zia regime was challenged in the case of Begum Nusrat Bhutto 
v. Chief of Army Staff and Federation of Pakistan, (1977) 29 PLD (SC) 657 (Pak.). In that case, the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan declared military intervention to have been necessary and “validated all 
actions pursuant to the military take-over, including constitutional suspension, new oaths for the 
judiciary, the promulgation of martial law orders, regulations and constitutional amendments, all acts 
to advance or promote the good of the people, and all acts required for the running of the State.” 
ELTAYEB, supra note 8, at 79. This decision had a profound effect on Zia’s ability to form a Pakistani 
state in line with his stated goals, as it gave his regime “a perfect legal vacuum in which to restructure 
the state by creating a complex and enduring state structure.” Id. 
 27. IFTIKHAR MALIK, THE HISTORY OF PAKISTAN 168 (2008). Following the 1977 election, 
which several dissident political parties accused of being rigged by then-Prime Minister Bhutto, an 
aggressive and violent anti-Bhutto campaign began, led by “religiopolitical parties such as the Jamaat-
i-Islami (JI), Jamiat Ulama-i-Islam (JUI), and Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Pakistan (JUP). These parties had 
mutual doctrinal differences yet demanded Islamization of the country, which soon became the 
common cry of their demonstrations.” Id. The situation escalated to the point where “200 
demonstrators were killed in Lahore, Karachi, and several other towns by the security forces.” Id. 
Bhutto responded by imposing martial law, but the demonstrations went on unabated, ending only 
when Zia took over control of the country through a military coup on July 5. Id. For a more in-depth 
discussion of the 1977 election and the violent movement that followed, see KHAN, supra note 14, at 
556–62. The onset of the controversy can be described in short, however, as follows: “The PNA 
alleged that the election had been rigged on a massive scale, rejected the results, boycotted the 
Provincial Assembly elections scheduled for 10 March, and launched a mass movement to secure 
Bhutto’s resignation and new elections under impartial auspices.” Id. at 556. 
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Islam to play a greater role in Pakistan, stating that he considered “the 
introduction of the Islamic system . . . an essential pre-requisite” for 
Pakistan.
28
 Additionally, Zia viewed his regime as the “guardian of the 
faith and made Islamization of the law a primary objective.”29 
Against this backdrop, Zia announced a program of legal Islamization 
for Pakistan in February of 1979.
30
 An initial step involved amending the 
Constitution by adding article 203-D, which established a Federal Shariat 
Court.
31
  
The most important aspect in Zia’s Islamization program involved the 
enactment of Islamic criminal legislation.
32
 Three ordinances and one 
presidential order
33
 were issued prescribing hadd punishments
34
 for 
criminal offenses,
35
 with possible permitted punishments including the 
 
 
 28. KHAN, supra note 14, at 579. This proclamation came among other remarks that included Zia 
accepting the challenge of leading Pakistan “as a true ‘soldier of Islam’” and opining that “Pakistan, 
which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam.” Id. He also 
promised a commitment to democracy and holding elections moving forward, saying via radio and 
television broadcast shortly after taking power that “he had faith in democracy and that elections 
would be held in ninety days and power would be transferred to the elected representatives of the 
people.” Id. Ultimately, however, Zia made good only on his pledge to make Pakistan and its laws 
more overtly Islamic. 
 29. ELTAYEB, supra note 8, at 79. In addition, Zia used his commitment to pursuing Islamization 
both to give himself political legitimacy and to justify “his retention of dictatorial powers and the 
suspension of constitutional rights.” Id. Zia’s rise coincided with the increased prominence and 
authority of the Islamic fundamentalist groups whose activism had led to Bhutto’s downfall, as he 
“relied upon the Islamic fundamentalist groups in the execution of his Islamization policy.” Id. For this 
reason, therefore, “the religious groups were given enormous opportunities to serve as judges, to 
control government television, to set requirements for university courses, and to attain government-
owned property to build mosques.” Id. 
 30. PETERS, supra note 12, at 155. 
 31. Id. “This constitutional amendment was the first step taken by Zia towards his programme of 
Islamization.” KHAN, supra note 14, at 640. The specific role of the Shariat Court was to determine 
“‘whether or not any law or provision of a law [was] repugnant to the injunctions of Islam, as laid 
down in the Holy Quran and the Sunna’ and [to] rescind laws found to be in conflict with Islam.” 
PETERS, supra note 12, at 155. The initial steps of Zia’s program also included the introduction of a 
ban on interest and the collection of the zakat tax. Id. 
 32. PETERS, supra note 12, at 155. This part of the plan was realized quickly through presidential 
decree on February 9, 1979. Id. 
 33. The following decrees were enacted: “Offenses Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) 
Ordinance, 1979; Offences of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979; Offences of Qazf 
(Enforcement of hadd) Ordinance, 1979; Prohibition (Enforcement of hadd) Ordinance, 1979.” Id. at 
156 n.25. The text of these decrees is reprinted in THE GOVT. OF PAKISTAN, NEW ISLAMIC LAWS: 
ENFORCEMENT OF HUDOOD ORDINANCE 87 (1979).  
 34. “Hadd means punishment ordained by the Holy Quran or Sunnah.” KHAN, supra note 14, at 
631 n.80. 
 35. PETERS, supra note 12, at 156. 
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amputation of body parts,
36
 whippings,
37
 and death by stoning.
38
 “These 
laws, according to Zia, formed a package introducing Islamic laws in 
Pakistan”39 in line with his stated goals for the increased Islamization of 
the country.
40
 In addition, three amendments (popularly referred to as the 
“blasphemy laws”) were added to the Pakistan Penal Code in 1980, 1982, 
and 1986, which criminalized “the defiling, by words or acts, of the 
Prophet Mohammed and his wives and relatives and the desecration of the 
Koran. The amendment of 1986 made such defiling of the Prophet a 
capital offence.”41  
The end result of the Zia-era reforms is a Pakistan which features a 
democratic, Western-style system of government that acts as the vehicle 
for implementing, and is tasked with enforcing, criminal laws based on 
substantive Islamic law.
42
 This shift has raised serious questions
43
 about 
 
 
 36. KHAN, supra note 14, at 628. “In case of theft or robbery, hadd punishment for amputation of 
the right hand from the joint of the wrist, for the first theft, and amputation of the left foot up to the 
ankle for the second theft, was provided.” Id. 
 37. Id. at 627–28. The punishment of whipping was prescribed for those found guilty of 
manufacturing, selling, or drinking liquor, as well as for those found guilty of fornication (intercourse 
between two unmarried individuals) and those found guilty of falsely accusing others of fornication or 
adultery. Id. 
 38. Id. at 628. Death by stoning was prescribed for those found guilty of adultery. Id. 
 39. Id. at 627. 
 40. Id.  
 41. PETERS, supra note 12, at 156. These provisions comprise sections 295-A, 295-B, and 295-C 
of the Pakistan Penal Code, and read as follows:  
295-A. Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by 
insulting Its religion or religious beliefs: Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of 
outraging the religious feelings of any class of the citizens of Pakistan, by words, either 
spoken or written, or by visible representations insults the religion or the religious beliefs of 
that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may 
extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both. 
295-B. Defiling, etc., of Holy Qur'an: Whoever willfully defiles, damages or desecrates a 
copy of the Holy Qur'an or of an extract therefrom or uses it in any derogatory manner or for 
any unlawful purpose shall be punishable with imprisonment for life. 
295-C. Use of derogatory remarks, etc., in respect of the Holy Prophet: Whoever by words, 
either spoken or written, or by visible representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or 
insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad 
(peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be 
liable to fine.  
Act XLV of 1860, PAK. PENAL CODE, amended by Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, No. 3 of 1986, 
THE GAZETTE OF PAKISTAN EXTRAORDINARY, Oct. 12, 1986. 
 42. PETERS, supra note 12, at 147–48. Pakistan is not alone in affecting its movement toward 
Islamization in such fashion:  
[I]ntroducing Islamic criminal law by statute law has been the rule. This shows that the 
Western idea that it is the state that lays down the law has been accepted, even by those 
countries that are re-Islamising their legal systems . . . . The result of the reintroduction of 
Islamic criminal law, in most countries, is that something new is created, a form of criminal 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss2/9
  
 
 
 
 
2014] BLASPHEMY LAWS IN PAKISTAN AND THE RIMSHA MASIH CASE 379 
 
 
 
 
whether the resultant criminal laws in Pakistan, particularly the blasphemy 
laws,
44
 violate the human rights of Pakistanis.
45
 While blasphemy laws by 
themselves do not always violate human rights, when they are 
“consistently applied against certain religious groups, their enforcement 
can be regarded as a violation of [the] principle [of freedom of religion].”46 
Such is the case in Pakistan, where blasphemy laws have routinely been 
used to persecute unpopular religious minorities, namely Christians and 
Ahmedis.
47
 
In addition to these practical concerns, the Zia-era Islamicized laws, 
particularly the blasphemy laws, have only served to further the tension 
and confusion Pakistan has grappled with in determining where, exactly, 
boundaries between religion and politics should be drawn in a 
governmental system where the form of government—western-style 
democracy—conflicts with many of the classical principles of Islam in 
whose name the country was created.
48
  
 
 
law consisting of Islamic substantive rules in a Western garb and embedded in a Western-type 
adjective law, with Western-type courts and Western institutions such as the state prosecutor. 
Id. Peters also describes a relevant ideological motive for countries such as Pakistan to adopt Islamic 
criminal law: “in doing so, it makes a clearly anti-Western statement. Islamic criminal law is one of 
those parts of the Shari’a that are most at variance with Western law and Western legal notions.” Id. at 
145. As a result, Islamic criminal law “has a highly symbolic value and its introduction is regarded as 
the litmus test for a real Islamisation of the legal system.” Id. 
 43. There is an important caveat to keep in mind, however, when considering this question. As 
Peters explains:  
The implementation of Islamic criminal law in recent decades has raised the question of its 
compatibility with universal human rights standards. Judging classical Islamic law—or other 
pre-modern systems, for that matter—by the standards of the modern doctrine of human 
rights is, obviously, anachronistic and futile. It is perfectly legitimate, however, to scrutinize 
the recently enacted Islamic penal codes for their compatibility with universal human rights 
standards. 
Id. at 174. 
 44. While many of the hadd crimes have been used sparingly by Pakistani courts, the blasphemy 
laws have been frequently utilized since their inception.  
 45. In particular, freedom of religion and freedom of expression. Id. at 175. 
 46. Id. at 180. 
 47. Id. The scope of this Note is primarily limited to recent uses of the blasphemy laws to 
persecute Christian minorities. For an in-depth examination of the use of law to discriminate against 
the freedom of religion of the Ahmadiyya, an Islamic movement considered heretical by many 
orthodox Muslims, see KHAN, supra note 14, and ELTAYEB, supra note 8. The plight of the Ahmadi 
can be summarized thusly: The Second Amendment to the Constitution (1974) classified the group as 
“non-Muslims.” This, in conjunction with Ordinance XX in 1984, whereby “the Ahmedis were 
prohibited from using any of the epithets, descriptions, or titles reserved for holy personages or places 
in Islam,” prevented them from “practising, preaching, and propagating their faith and . . . made 
[them] liable to harassment and prosecution for any of their religious practices.” KHAN, supra note 14, 
at 664.  
 48. MALIK, supra note 27, at 206. “Pakistan’s simplified rationale as a polity created in the name 
of Islam—a premise often applied hastily—has only complicated the ambiguous intersection between 
politics and religion.” Id. The problem can also be described in terms of a tension between tradition 
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IV. A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT WESTERN COUNTRIES: MOVEMENT AWAY 
FROM BLASPHEMY LAWS 
As blasphemy laws in Pakistan were being codified, Great Britain was 
witnessing the final criminal conviction that would ever occur under its 
own blasphemy laws
49
 in the Gay News case, where the Gay News 
newspaper and its editor were punished for publishing a controversial, 
homoerotic poem about the crucifixion of Jesus.
50
 By 2008, the law would 
be repealed.
51
 The repeal followed popular organized support against the 
laws,
52
 as well as years of growing indifference to their use.
53
  
The death of blasphemy laws in England is illustrative of a larger 
movement among Western and democratic nations. The Council of 
Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly has taken the position “that blasphemy, 
 
 
and modernity: “By emphasizing its Islamic credentials while being mostly ruled by westernized elite 
whose own mindset and interests are inextricably linked with the West, Pakistan has often found it 
difficult to locate a synthesis between some highly contentious realms of tradition and modernity.” Id. 
at 207. Thus there is arguably a very real and problematic disconnect between both the form of 
government and Islam, and between the underlying ideals which attach to each; it is no surprise, then, 
that many citizens who take matters into their own hands when it comes to blasphemy allegations do 
so because they have so little faith in, and so little interest in operating within, the western-democratic 
legal system of Pakistan, as it represents a clear departure from traditional, Islamic ideals. Khan offers 
a succinct summary of the system of governance that has resulted in Pakistan due to these tensions: 
“Democracy, the system ostensibly given by the various constitutions in Pakistan, has never been 
allowed to function effectively.” Kahn, supra note 14, at 851. 
 49. Ruth Geller, Goodbye to Blasphemy in Britain, AM. HUMANIST ASS’N (May 14, 2008), 
http://americanhumanist.org/hnn/archives/?id=348&article=0. The centuries-old laws prohibited 
“insult to the tenets and beliefs of the Church of England,” but failed to include any protections for 
Judaism, Islam, or any other religions. Id. 
 50. R. v. Lemon, [1979] A.C. 617 (H.L.). In this case, a conservative Christian named Mary 
Whitehouse brought suit against the Gay News newspaper in objection to its publication of a poem 
entitled “The Love that Dares to Speak its Name,” which features a male Roman centurion removing 
Jesus’ body from the cross and performing sex acts on it. The paper’s editor, Denis Lemon, and the 
paper were fined. Id. at 620. Prior to the Gay News case, the last conviction under the blasphemy law 
in Great Britain had occurred in 1921. R. v. Gott, (1922) 16 Cr. App. R. 87. In that case, a man was 
sentenced to nine months in prison for publishing a pamphlet describing “Jesus Christ entering 
Jerusalem ‘like a circus clown on the back of two donkeys.’” suggested that Christ looked like a clown 
as he entered Jerusalem.” Id. at 88. See also 1977: Gay Paper Guilty of Blasphemy, BBC NEWS (July 
11, 1977), available at news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/low/dates/stories/july/11/newsid_2499000/2499 
721.stm.  
 51. Geller, supra note 49. The blasphemy laws were “officially abolished on May 8, 2008.” Id. 
 52. For example, a 2002 organized protest that involved “The Love that Dares to Speak its 
Name” being read aloud on the steps of a church in central London produced no arrests or 
governmental action. Erotic Poem Challenges Blasphemy Law, TELEGRAPH (July 11, 2002, 12:36 
PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1401051/Erotic-poem-challenges-blasphemy-law.html. 
 53. LEONARD LEVY, BLASPHEMY: VERBAL OFFENSE AGAINST THE SACRED, FROM MOSES TO 
SALMAN RUSHDIE 535 (1993). Some would argue, in fact, that “[b]y the 1960s, England had become 
indifferent to blasphemy.” Id. 
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as an insult to a religion, should not be deemed a criminal offence.”54 The 
United States has opposed blasphemy laws on the grounds, among others, 
that they violate free speech.
55
 The countries that sit on the United Nations 
Human Rights Council have also voiced opposition to pro-blasphemy law 
resolutions introduced therein.
56
 
This trend, however, is in sharp contrast to the position taken by many 
of the world’s Islamic states, evidenced by the actions of the fifty-seven-
nation Organization of Islamic States (OIC).
57
 The group has consistently 
sponsored resolutions protecting against the “defamation” of religions 
before both the United Nations Human Rights Council and the General 
Assembly,
58
 and has vigorously campaigned for “‘an international 
blasphemy law.’”59 
 
 
 54. Eur. Parl. Ass., Recommendation 1805: Blasphemy, religious insults and hate speech against 
persons on grounds of their religion ¶ 4, 2007 Sess., Doc. No. 11296 as amended (2007), available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta07/EREC1805.htm. The 
Recommendation reasoned, in support of its position, that “[a] distinction should be made between 
matters relating to moral conscience and those relating to what is lawful, matters which belong to the 
public domain, and those which belong to the private sphere.” Id. 
 55. Additionally, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom’s 2009 
Annual Report was harshly critical in its assessment of the blasphemy laws in Pakistan, finding that 
“[b]lasphemy allegations, which are often false, result in the lengthy detentions of, and sometimes 
violence against, Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, and members of other religious minorities.” U.S. 
COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 68, available at http://www.uscirf 
.gov/sites/default/files/resources/final%20ar2009%20with%20cover.pdf. Beyond the freedom of 
speech and religious minority persecution concerns, the report also lists as a major issue with the 
blasphemy laws the “lack of due process involved” in the proceedings, citing the minimal evidentiary 
requirements and the tendency for Islamic militants to “pack the courtroom and make public threats of 
violence” during blasphemy trials. Id. 
 56. AUSTIN DACEY, THE FUTURE OF BLASPHEMY: SPEAKING OF THE SACRED IN AN AGE OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (2012). “Their objection was fundamental: persons have rights; religions do not. As 
the European Union put it, ‘human rights law protects primarily individuals in the exercise of their 
freedom of religion or belief, rather than the religions as such.’” Id. 
 57. Id. at 1. The group represents itself as “the collective voice of the Islamic world.” Id. 
Pakistan is one of the members of the OIC. Id. Dacey raises an important point about the global debate 
over defamation, in which the OIC has played a central role: “The debate over the defamation of 
religions cannot be separated from a global political movement to ‘Islamize’ human rights standards.” 
Id. at 7. The OIC, Dacey explains, has long pushed such a position, as demonstrated by the several 
iterations of its Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, which takes the approach of 
“constrain[ing] the universal standards by subordinating them to religious law.” Id. The 1990 
Declaration, for example, states that “[a]ll the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are 
subject to the Islamic Shari’ah.” Id. Thus, the OIC’s position is that when it comes to freedom of 
expression, “it is Islam, and not the individual believer or disbeliever, that deserves protection.” Id. 
This is, in short, the underlying logic that influences how the OIC approaches the issue of blasphemy 
laws and religious defamation. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Don’t Link Minister’s Murder to Blasphemy: Pakistani UN Delegate, TRIBUNE (Pak.) (Mar. 
4, 2011), http://tribune.com.pk/story/127504/dont-link-ministers-murder-to-blasphemy/. The OIC has 
had support in this campaign not just from its own member states, but also from African states and 
others countries including Cuba and Russia. Id. 
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V. THE CURRENT STATE OF PAKISTAN’S BLASPHEMY LAWS 
The position taken by the OIC is demonstrative of the current state of 
Pakistan’s blasphemy laws. The Pakistani blasphemy laws have been 
heavily used since their inception. According to Human Rights Watch, 
“[t]here have been 1,400 blasphemy cases since the laws were first enacted 
in 1986. There are more than 15 cases of people on death row for 
blasphemy in Pakistan, and 52 people have been killed while facing trial 
for the charge.”60 Hundreds of Christians, who make up three percent of 
Pakistan’s population, have been among the accused, and at least twelve 
Christians have been given death sentences.
61
  
In addition to disproportionate targeting of minority groups, there are 
many other problems with the blasphemy laws in Pakistan, both in terms 
of their structure and application. On a procedural level, the laws are 
problematic because no hard evidence beyond the word of anyone 
claiming to be a witness is required,
62
 and the accused is arrested and 
imprisoned immediately, left to await trial in jail.
63
 In addition, the laws 
are flawed in their application because false accusations generally go 
unpunished,
64
 which encourages blasphemy allegations based on personal 
grudges or in hopes of financial gain.
65
  
 
 
 60. Reza Sayah & Nasir Habib, Setback for Pakistani Teen Facing Blasphemy Charges, CNN 
(Oct. 1, 2012, 3:10 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/01/world/asia/pakistan-blasphemy-girl/. While 
arrests are frequent on blasphemy charges, and vigilante justice is rampant, the courts themselves have 
been relatively sympathetic to blasphemy defendants. While lower courts have “handed down 
hundreds of convictions,” nearly all of them have been reversed by higher courts “due to lack of 
evidence, faults in due process or obvious wrongful motives on the part of the complainants.” Q&A: 
Pakistan’s Controversial Blasphemy Laws, BBC NEWS (Sept. 2, 2012, 9:02 AM), http://www.bbc.co. 
uk/news/world-south-asia-12621225. This phenomenon only serves to strengthen the assertion that the 
real source of blasphemy law enforcement and punishment is vigilantism and, further, that that 
vigilantism exists outside of—and often in direct opposition to the wishes of—the court system. 
 61. Q&A: Pakistan’s Controversial Blasphemy Laws, supra note 60. In addition, the Ahmadi, 
another religious minority group, are also frequently the targets of blasphemy charges. All told, 
“[a]pproximately 2,432 Ahmadis have been charged in 654 blasphemy cases.” ELTAYEB, supra note 8, 
at 92. 
 62. DAVID PINAULT, NOTES FROM THE FORTUNE-TELLING PARROT: ISLAM AND THE STRUGGLE 
FOR RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN PAKISTAN 47 (2008). “No evidence is required in filing a blasphemy 
complaint. The word of anyone claiming to be a witness is enough.” Id. 
 63. Id. “The alleged blasphemer is arrested and imprisoned as soon as the complaint is lodged.” 
Id. 
 64. Id. “[P]laintiffs can make false accusations with little worry of punishment or any other legal 
repercussion.” Id. 
 65. Id. This has in fact been shown to be prevalent: The National Commission for Justice and 
Peace found that “in over one hundred cases where defendants in recent blasphemy trials were found 
innocent, the accusers were shown by the court to have been motivated by personal grudges or hopes 
of financial gain.” Id. This possibility has been raised in the Rimsha Masih case, with witnesses 
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VI. VIGILANTISM IN RESPONSE TO BLASPHEMY ALLEGATIONS  
The high level of support within Pakistan for the blasphemy laws is 
rooted in two key areas: political support and popular support, with the 
latter strongly influencing the former. Many politicians either support the 
laws, or refuse to propose changing them out of fear of losing political 
power, or worse, their lives. Meanwhile, popular support for the laws 
comes from a vocal and active portion of the population that has shown a 
consistent willingness to use violence to exact “justice” on alleged 
blasphemers and politicians who speak against the laws. 
The courts and authorities are frequently overruled by Pakistani 
citizens engaging in vigilantism to bring justice upon alleged 
blasphemers.
66
 Often, arrests are made on blasphemy charges primarily in 
order to appease violent mobs who storm the neighborhoods and homes of 
accused blasphemers.
67
 Vigilantes have also frequently beaten and killed 
accused blasphemers—including those who have been acquitted and those 
awaiting trial—both in and out of police custody.68 Since the blasphemy 
 
 
coming forward and stating that the imam who accused Rimsha did so out of a motivation to drive 
Christians from the area.  
 66. U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 55. The report summarizes the 
dangers faced by those accused of blasphemy in Pakistan at the hands of vigilantes:  
[D]uring blasphemy trials, Islamic militants often pack the courtroom and make public threats 
of violence as a consequence of an acquittal. Such threats have proven credible since they 
have sometimes been followed by violence . . . . Several of those accused under the 
blasphemy laws have been attacked, even killed, by violent extremists, including while in 
police custody. Those who escape official punishment or attacks by extremists are sometimes 
forced to flee the country.  
Id. at 68. 
 67. Take, for example, the case of four teenage Ahmadi boys who were arrested after being 
accused of writing Muhammad’s name on a bathroom wall. Although no evidence was presented, the 
boys were arrested after “[l]ocal religious extremists had made it clear that they would avenge the 
insult if the authorities would not.” Dacey, supra note 56, at 6. A similar process was followed in the 
Rimsha Masih case, with authorities only arresting her after an angry mob had surrounded her home. 
The same also went for sixteen-year-old Ryan Stanten (discussed infra Part VII), against whom 
authorities promised to pursue charges for blasphemy after an angry mob ransacked his home: “[T]he 
police arrived at the scene and tried to appease the protesters by assuring them that a case would be 
registered.” Christian Teenager Ryan Stanten Held for Blasphemy in Pakistan, CONT’L NEWS (Oct. 
21, 2012), available at http://www.usbibleprophecy.com/wp/?p=3594#.Uoy_6aVgq44. 
 68. The Blasphemy Law in Pakistan Contemptuous, supra note 1.  
Dozens of accused have been murdered, in or out of jail. In July a mentally disturbed Muslim 
man, arrested for blasphemy in the Punjab city of Bahawalpur, was dragged out of the police 
station by a crowd of 2,000 and set on fire. In 2009 accusations of blasphemy led a mob to 
attack Christians in Gojra in [the] Punjab province. At least eight were burned to death. 
Id. Numerous additional examples exist, including the 2009 case of nineteen-year-old Christian Fanish 
Masih, who was accused of flushing a chapter of the Koran down a drain, arrested, and held in solitary 
confinement. “He was found dead in his cell. The warden said Masih hung himself. Others called it 
‘extra-judicial murder.’” Dacey, supra note 56, at 6. Another example is the four teenage Ahmadi 
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laws took effect in 1986, fifty-two people have been killed while awaiting 
trial.
69
 In Rimsha’s case, the opposing attorney, Rao Abdur Raheem, 
called for such a response in the event she escaped conviction.
70
 
Acts of vigilantism are not limited to targeting the accused. Politicians 
and judges have also been victims of violence for speaking out against the 
laws.
71
 Two prominent examples are the assassinations of politicians 
Salman Taseer and Shahbaz Bhatti in early 2011. Taseer, the governor of 
the Punjab province, had publicly voiced his opposition to the blasphemy 
laws and led a charge to reform them.
72
 He was assassinated by his 
bodyguard, Mumtaz Qadri, who admitted to the killing and cited Taseer’s 
opposition to the blasphemy laws as his motivation.
73
 While Christians in 
Pakistan and the international community condemned the killing, it was 
“welcomed by some in Pakistan, including by judges and lawyers and 
media commentators.”74 Many hailed Qadri as a hero, with some 40,000 
 
 
boys—Muhammad Irfan, Tahir Imran, Tahir Mehmood, and Naseer Ahmad—who were arrested after 
being accused of “desecrating the Prophet by writing his name on the bathroom wall of a mosque in 
Punjab province.” Id. Even though no evidence was presented to prove the allegation, “the head of the 
local police felt that ‘the gravity of the case against Islam justified arresting the children first.’” Id. 
 69. Sayah & Habib, supra note 60. 
 70. Saeed Shah, Pakistan Blasphemy Case: ‘Muslims Could Take Law into Their Own Hands,’ 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 30, 2012, 10:40 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/30/pakistan-
blasphemy-case-muslims-law. Raheem, sitting in his office beneath a large poster of Mumtaz Qadri, 
cited the assassin as an example, warning that “[t]here are many Mumtaz Qadris in this country.” Id. 
Raheem went on to declare that “[i]f the court is not allowed to do its work, because the state is 
helping the accused, then the public has no other option but to take the law into their own hands.” Id. 
He concluded that “[t]his girl is guilty. If the state overrides the court, then God will get a person to do 
the job.” Id. 
 71. In addition to politicians, “judges who have ordered acquittals have been assassinated.” Ben 
Doherty, Girl Accused of Burning Koran Goes into Hiding, BRISBANE TIMES (Sept. 10, 2012), 
http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/world/girl-accused-of-burning-koran-goes-into-hiding-20120909-25 
mh6.html. Of course politicians, in addition to risking their lives, also risk losing political support by 
publicly opposing the blasphemy laws, which is yet another reason they so rarely do so—it is a poor 
strategy for winning elections. Thus even though “[a]mending the blasphemy laws has been on the 
agenda of nearly all the popular secular parties,” none of them have made very much progress, 
primarily because “no major party wants to antagonize the religious parties which have on numerous 
occasions proved capable of bringing large numbers of protesters on to the streets.” Q&A: Pakistan’s 
Controversial Blasphemy Laws, supra note 60. The most recent example of a failed attempt at reform 
came in 2010, when Sherry Rehman, a member of the ruling Pakistan People’s Party introduced a bill 
to make modest changes to the blasphemy laws. Id. The bill was ultimately withdrawn in February of 
2011 “under pressure from religious forces as well as some opposition political groups.” Id. Pakistani 
correspondents explained that “[g]iven the growing religious conservatism in Pakistan, the government 
is wary about losing public support over the issue.” Id. 
 72. Demonstrators Prevent Court Appearance of Alleged Pakistani Assassin, VOICE OF AM. (Jan. 
5, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://www.voanews.com/content/disruptions-mark-remand-of-alleged-pakistani-
assassin-113016474/133207.html. 
 73. Don’t Link Minister’s Murder to Blasphemy, supra note 59.  
 74. Id. Hundreds of lawyers declared that they would be willing to defend Qadri. Demonstrators 
Prevent Court Appearance of Alleged Pakistani Assassin, supra note 72. In addition, 500 conservative 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss2/9
  
 
 
 
 
2014] BLASPHEMY LAWS IN PAKISTAN AND THE RIMSHA MASIH CASE 385 
 
 
 
 
supporters filling the streets and showering him with rose petals as he was 
brought to court following his arrest.
75
  
In March of 2011, Shahbaz Bhatti, Pakistan’s Minorities Minister, was 
assassinated as a result of his support of religious minorities and his work 
to reform the blasphemy laws. Bhatti had frequently spoken against the 
blasphemy laws, including publicly supporting Asia Bibi,
76
 a Christian 
sentenced to death in a high-profile blasphemy case.
77
 A Pakistani branch 
of the Taliban, Tehrik-i-Taliban, took credit for Bhatti’s assassination and 
declared that he had been killed because he was a “known blasphemer.”78 
Much like the response to Taseer’s assassination, Pakistani Christians and 
the international community condemned the killing, while the responses 
 
 
religious scholars issued a proclamation “praising the assassination and warning that anyone who 
expresses grief over the killing could suffer the same fate.” Id. 
 75. Declan Walsh, Pakistani Christians Protest After Assassination of Shahbaz Bhatti, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 3, 2011, 11:29 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/03/pakistan-
christians-shahbaz-bhatti-assassination. Qadri also received “scores” of Valentine’s Day cards from 
supporters and admirers while in jail after his arrest. Id. 
 76. Bhatti Knew About Threat to His Life from Taliban, Qaeda, DECCAN HERALD (Mar. 2, 
2011). http://www.deccanherald.com/content/142473/bhatti-kthreat-his-life-taliban.html. Bhatti had 
received increasingly frequent death threats from extremists groups prior to his death as a result of his 
outspoken support of minorities and his criticism of the blasphemy laws. Id. He first began receiving 
threats after “he spoke in support of Christians who were attacked by an extremist group at Gojra in 
Punjab in 2009.” Id. Fresh threats were aimed at him after speaking out in support of Asia Bibi 
following her arrest and sentencing. Id.  
 77. Rob Crilly, Christian Woman Sentenced to Death in Pakistan for Blasphemy, TELEGRAPH 
(Nov. 9, 2010, 5:36 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/8120142/Christian-woman-
sentenced-to-death-in-Pakistan-for-blasphemy.html. The Asia Bibi case is a classic example of how 
blasphemy law accusations and subsequent arrests often unfold in Pakistan. Bibi had apparently been 
working as a farmhand with other women and was asked to retrieve drinking water. Id. “Some of the 
other women—all Muslims—refused to drink the water as it had been brought by a Christian and was 
therefore ‘unclean’, according to Mrs. Bibi's evidence, sparking a row.” Id. A few days later, Bibi was 
“set upon by a mob.” Id. The police were called and they “took her to a police station for her own 
safety.” Id. True to form, however, public pressure persisted, including from some Muslim clerics, 
calling for Bibi’s death as a blasphemer. In the face of this pressure, the police responded by 
registering a blasphemy case against Bibi. She was held in solitary confinement for more than a year 
before eventually being sentenced to death in November of 2010. Id. As of August, 2013, Bibi 
remained in prison, where she is given raw materials to cook meals for herself, rather than prepared 
food, out of administrators’ fears that she may be poisoned. Anthony Bond, Sentenced to Death for 
Being Thirsty: Christian Woman Tells of Moment She Was Beaten and Locked Up in Pakistan After 
Using Muslim Women's Cup to Drink Water, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 28, 2013, 6:03 AM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2403773/Christian-woman-Asia-Bibi-jailed-Pakistan-using-
Muslim-womens-cup-drink-water.html. 
 78. Pakistan Minorities Minister Shahbaz Bhatti Shot Dead, BBC NEWS (Mar. 2, 2011, 1:16 
PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12617562. Bhatti, forty-two years old, “had just 
left his mother’s home in a suburb of the capital when several gunmen surrounded his vehicle and 
riddled it with bullets.” Id. The spokesman for Tehrik-i-Taliban added that they would “continue to 
target all those who speak against the law which punishes those who insult the prophet . . . their fate 
will be the same.” Id. 
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from political and religious leaders ranged from muted to outright 
support.
79
  
The emergence of this informal system whereby vigilantism wins out 
in the arena of blasphemy law enforcement—where arrests are made based 
on popular pressure and protests, punishment is handed down in the street 
more often than in the courtroom, and politicians, on fear of assassination, 
feel constrained to maintain the status quo—has created a system of 
governance in Pakistan that exists and operates outside of the realm of the 
government’s control, and outside of the rule of law. This phenomenon is 
inextricably linked to the inherent tension between the democratic 
structure of Pakistan and the Islamicized laws that dominate the criminal 
law. The resulting “system” is one of instability where the state prevails in 
some realms and instances, and vigilantism rules in others, most strikingly 
and frequently in regard to the blasphemy laws.
80
  
VII. THE RIMSHA MASIH CASE: TURNING POINT OR OUTLIER? 
As Rimsha Masih’s case unfolded, many observers argued that it may 
signal a turning point for the blasphemy laws in Pakistan. These observers 
have argued that “for the first time, the state has pushed back.”81 For 
example, “[i]t is the first time in a blasphemy case that someone has ever 
been arrested for fabricating evidence.”82 In addition, politicians and 
Muslim religious leaders have spoken out in defense of Rimsha in greater 
 
 
 79. Walsh, supra note 75. In a public display rare for Christians in Pakistan, hundreds took to the 
street in protest after Bhatti’s death, with “demonstrations held across Punjab, where the Christian 
community is concentrated, with protesters burnings t[i]res and demanding justice.” Id. Meanwhile, 
“many opposition leaders offered a muted response to Bhatti’s death, condemning the violence but 
offering little of the fiery rhetoric that normally characterizes discourse in Pakistan.” Id. Some 
opposition leaders went even further, taking actions that appeared outright supportive of the 
assassination: “When the prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, led a two-minute silence in parliament, 
three members of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam party remained seated,” while Rafi Usmani, grand mufti of 
Pakistan, declared “I am afraid that this could be an American conspiracy to defame the government of 
Pakistan, Muslims, and Islam.” Id. 
 80. Yilmaz has stated this proposition succinctly: “[T]he socio-legal sphere in Pakistan is 
fragmented resulting from clashes between the official law and civil disobedience . . . one can say that 
Islamization of law in Pakistan has neither destroyed Anglo-Muhammadan law nor local folk laws. It 
has only increased the inconsistency and instability of the system.” YILMAZ, supra note 20, at 129–30. 
 81. The Blasphemy Law in Pakistan Contemptuous, supra note 1. The article went on to report 
that “[e]ven if repeal seems impossible, some see a chance to reform the blasphemy law—demanding 
a higher burden of evidence for accusations, for instance.” Id. 
 82. Jon Boone, Christian Girl Hailed as ‘Daughter of Nation’ by Senior Pakistani Cleric, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/03/christian-girl-senior-
pakistani-cleric-blasphemy. This sentiment has been echoed by Ali Dayan Hasan, the Pakistan director 
of Human Rights Watch, who says that the pursuit of accusations against the cleric is significant 
because “never before has a false accuser been held accountable.” Sayah & Habib, supra note 60.  
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numbers and with greater fervor than for past accusers. Many, including 
the President of Pakistan, called for an investigation.
83
 Even some 
prominent conservative Muslim clerics spoke out, including one of 
Pakistan’s most senior Islamic clerics, Allama Tahir Ashrafi, who called 
for a full investigation, “lambasted” the Imam Chishti, and hailed Rimsha 
as a “daughter of the nation.”84 
Most importantly, Rimsha’s acquittal itself has been hailed as a sign of 
progress. So too has the decision by the Supreme Court to dismiss the 
appeal of her acquittal
85
 including, in particular, a portion of the Court’s 
opinion that warned Muslims to be “careful” when making blasphemy 
allegations, and cautioned against the courts being “used as a tool for 
ulterior motive.”86 The fact that Rimsha escaped conviction, that her 
accuser was held accountable, and that the case progressed quickly are 
indeed all plausible signs of progress. 
However, there are several factors indicating that these unprecedented 
developments occurred primarily as a result of the very unique 
circumstances of the case, rather than as a result of some larger movement 
toward reform. First, Rimsha, a juvenile with diminished mental capacity, 
is not a typical defendant. Second, the case itself was not a typical 
blasphemy case. To be certain, charges are often made based on a single 
accusation with no supporting evidence, but this case was unique in that 
“there was clear evidence that [Rimsha] was framed.”87 Finally the case, 
 
 
 83. Boone, supra note 1. 
 84. Boone, supra note 82. Ashrafi, chairman of the All Pakistan Ulema Council, made his 
remarks at a “fiery press conference . . . flanked by other senior clerics.” Id. He demanded that all 
branches of the Pakistani state work together to investigate the circumstances surrounding Rimsha’s 
arrest, and declared that “[o]ur heads are bowed with shame for what Chishti did.” Id. Ashrafi also 
opined that Chishti was serving as the “front man” for other individuals who “wanted to stoke local 
antagonism against the Christian minority in the area in order to force them to flee.” Id. Ashrafi’s 
supportive words and tone notwithstanding, it is notable that he “said he had been moved to speak out 
after reading reports that Rimsha had Down’s syndrome, a condition that also affects [his] 15-year-old 
son.” Id. In addition, he was careful to maintain that there was no need to change or repeal the 
blasphemy laws in the wake of this case, only their implementation: “[t]here is no problem with the 
law—only the implementation of the law is the problem.” Id. 
 85. Asher John, SC Throws Out Plea Challenging Rimsha Masih’s Acquittal, PAKISTAN TODAY 
(Jan. 17, 2013, 2:34 AM), http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2013/01/17/news/national/sc-throws-out-
plea-challenging-rimsha-masihs-acquittal-2/. “A three-member bench of Pakistan’s Supreme Court on 
January 15 dismissed a petition challenging the quashing of charges against a teenage Christian girl 
accused of desecrating the Holy Quran in September last year.” Id. 
 86. Pakistan Supreme Court Confirms Decision to Drop Blasphemy Case, supra note 7. 
 87. Rob Crilly, Rimsha Masih May Have Been Spared, But Pakistan’s Blood-Curdling 
Blasphemy Laws Still Need To Be Reformed, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 20, 2012), http://blogs.telegraph 
.co.uk/news/robcrilly/100190638/rimshas-justice-is-the-exception-not-the-rule-in-pakistan/. 
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partly due to the preceding two factors, received an inordinate amount
88
 of 
local and international media attention.
89
 Most blasphemy cases are not 
afforded such intense media coverage, if they receive any at all.
90
 The high 
level of media attention may well have emboldened witnesses and 
pressured Pakistani officials. 
In addition, several factors and events since Rimsha’s arrest provide 
strong evidence that, in reality, very little has changed in the arena of 
blasphemy laws.  
First, Chishti was ultimately acquitted of all charges against him by the 
Islamabad High Court on August 17, 2013.
91
 Six of the eight witnesses 
against him changed or recanted their statements in court, prompting the 
acquittal.
92
 Thus, for all of the attention and praise his arrest received as 
evidence of the state finally “holding an accuser accountable,” the end 
result was that Chishti avoided any punishment or lasting repercussions 
for his actions. 
Moreover, there have been several aspects of Rimsha’s case which 
have constituted a decidedly normal response to a blasphemy allegation. 
While politicians and religious leaders spoke out, they made certain to 
stop short of calling for a change in the laws.
93
 Further, vigilantism still 
played its usual role. Rimsha’s initial arrest occurred in order to appease a 
large crowd of protestors,
94
 and, like many other accused, she faced the 
constant threat of harm or death at the hands of vigilantes taking matters 
into their own hands, particularly following her acquittal.
95
 In fact, the 
 
 
 88. Id. As a result, “every twist and turn, every court appearance and piece of evidence, was 
[scrutinized] around the world.” Id.  
 89. Id. In his opinion piece, Rob Crilly makes a compelling argument that this was in part due to 
location. Rimsha’s home is located in Mehrabad, just outside of Islamabad. Many of the hearings and 
court proceedings in the case occurred there, offering a conveniently short trip for the scores of 
international journalists who are based in Islamabad: “Reporters could vox pop Rimsha’s neighbours 
and still be home in time for lunch. Likewise each court hearing.” Id. 
 90. Id. “In contrast, hundreds of other cases in remote corners [of] Punjab or upper Sidh go 
unreported month after month. Even when they are reported, they are soon forgotten.” Id. 
 91. Rimsha Case: Cleric Khalid Chisti Acquitted, TRIBUNE (Pak.) (Aug. 17, 2013), 
http://tribune.com.pk/story/591445/rimsha-case-cleric-khalid-chisti-acquitted/. 
 92. Id. 
 93.  See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 94. Boone, supra note 1. 
 95. After initially being granted bail, “Rimsha had to be airlifted by police helicopter to avoid an 
angry mob,” and then had to go into hiding with her family while awaiting her upcoming court 
proceedings. Pakistan Supreme Court Confirms Decision to Drop Blasphemy Case, supra note 7. A 
report in the Tribune published in late December, 2012, summarized succinctly Rimsha’s and her 
family’s plight: “Rimsha and her family will spend Christmas as they have spent the last four 
months—in hiding, fearing for their lives.” Cold Christmas Awaits Christians in Rimsha's 
Neighbourhood, TRIBUNE (Pak.) (Dec. 21, 2012), http://tribune.com.pk/story/482446/cold-christmas-
awaits-christians-in-rimshas-neighbourhood/. 
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danger she and her family faced prompted many to speculate that “she and 
her family [would] have no future in Pakistan, where their lives will 
always remain at risk.”96 That prediction proved prescient, as Rimsha and 
her family, after months of hiding, have taken refuge in Canada after 
moving there around April of 2013.
97
 In addition to the repercussions for 
Rimsha and her family, fallout from the case has negatively affected other 
Christians living in Rimsha’s neighborhood of Mehrabad.98 
Finally, and most importantly, there has been no change in the way 
blasphemy allegations have been handled or enforced since Rimsha’s case 
arose. Instead, there has only been more of the same: accusations based on 
flimsy evidence, mob violence and vigilantism, and charges brought in the 
interest of appeasing the masses. Two cases in particular that occurred 
shortly after Rimsha’s September, 2012, arrest offer compelling evidence 
that her case was, in fact, an outlier. These cases show that even the 
unprecedented support for Rimsha, coupled with her legal victory, has not 
been enough to effect real change. The blasphemy laws continue to be 
used aggressively, even against juveniles, and vigilantism continues to 
rule.  
In December of 2012, 200 people stormed a police station in Karachi, 
overpowered the officers stationed there, and seized a man who was in 
custody after being accused of desecrating the Koran.
99
 The man was 
beaten to death and set on fire.
100
 
Two months prior, on Wednesday, October 10, 2012, a sixteen -year–
old Christian boy named Ryan Stanten from Karachi was charged with 
 
 
 96. Pakistan Supreme Court Confirms Decision to Drop Blasphemy Case, supra note 7. 
 97. Rimsha Masih, Pakistani Girl Accused of Blasphemy, Finds Refuge in Canada, GUARDIAN 
(June 30, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/01/pakistan-girl-accused-blasphemy-
canada. Canadian Immigration Minister Jason Kenney revealed the family’s presence in Canada in 
June, 2013. Id. He explained that a Pakistani contact reached out to him in January of 2013 asking 
whether the family could flee to Canada, and that subsequently “a number of people did some very 
dangerous, delicate work to extricate her and her family from Pakistan, and we provided the necessary 
visas." Id. 
 98. Cold Christmas Awaits Christians in Rimsha's Neighbourhood, supra note 95. In Mehrabad, 
“things have become much more difficult since the Rimsha case.” Id. Many of Mehrabad’s roughly 
400 Christian families fled when Rimsha was arrested out of fear for their own safety, and those that 
have returned found themselves even more marginalized than before. Id. For example, a local landlord 
shut down a makeshift church the Christian community had built, and they were too fearful of 
retaliation to observe their usual Christmas traditions, such as installing a Christmas tree. Id. Ashraf 
Masih, a Christian resident of the area, summarized the situation: “We are scared. We are frightened. 
We cannot sit together, we cannot speak loudly, we cannot celebrate openly. We have threats.” Id. 
 99. Mariya Karimjee, Pakistan: Mob Beats to Death Muslim Man Accused of Blasphemy, 
GLOBAL POST (Dec. 22, 2012), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/ 
pakistan/121222/pakistan-mob-beats-death-muslim-man-accused-blasp. The man, who was a Muslim, 
was also reported to be mentally unstable. 
 100. Id.  
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blasphemy after allegedly forwarding anti-Islamic text messages to several 
members of the middle-class staff colony of the Sui Southern Gas 
Company where he and his mother, who worked for the company,
101
 
resided.
102
 Stanten claimed to have forwarded the message without reading 
it, but word spread quickly, and he and his mother were quickly forced 
into hiding.
103
 An angry mob ransacked the Stanten home shortly 
thereafter, “dragg[ing] furniture out of [the] house and set[ting] fire to it in 
the street.”104 Ultimately, police calmed the protesters by assuring them 
that they would file charges against Stanten.
105
  
In addition to those two incidents, the year following Rimsha’s arrest 
has seen several more examples of the pervasiveness of the blasphemy 
laws and their enforcement through vigilantism. On July 20, 2013, a 
Christian couple in Gojra in the Punjab Province was arrested and charged 
with blasphemy.
106
 Shafgat Masih, who is handicapped, and his wife 
Shagufta Kosar, a maid at a school, were accused of sending text messages 
containing blasphemous content.
107
 Following a court hearing two days 
after their arrest, they were held in jail.
108
  
On September 2, 2013, a forty-year-old Christian mother of four and 
schoolteacher was arrested and jailed on blasphemy charges in Lahore.
109
 
The woman, Salma alias Fatima, was accused by a local cleric of 
distributing a pamphlet carrying “contemptuous” remarks.110 
 
 
 101. Christian Boy in Pakistan Arrested for Blasphemy, BBC NEWS (Oct. 11, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19906528. Stanten’s mother was subsequently dismissed from 
her job at the company. Id. 
 102. Salman Masood, Pakistani Teenager in Hiding After Blasphemy Accusation, Police Say, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/world/asia/teenager-in-hiding-after-
blasphemy-accusation-pakistani-police-say.html?_r=0. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. The crowd, which was led to the residence by Islamic clerics, reportedly shouted insults 
against the family in addition to ransacking the home and setting several household items on fire. 
Christian Teenager Ryan Stanten Held for Blasphemy in Pakistan, supra note 67. 
 105. Id. “The police said they had opened the case against him to calm the mob, which human 
rights campaigners say is a common tactic in such situations.” Id. Stanten was indeed charged with a 
blasphemy offense under Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code, violation of which carries with it 
a possible sentence of death. S. Raza Hassan, Teenage Christian Boy Booked for Blasphemy, DAWN 
PAKISTAN (Oct. 11, 2012), http://dawn.com/2012/10/11/house-ransacked-furniture-torched-teenage-
christian-boy-booked-for-blasphemy/. 
 106. Christian Couple Charged with Blasphemy in Pakistan, ALETEIA (July 25, 2013), 
http://www.aleteia.org/en/world/news/christian-couple-charged-with-blasphemy-2758007. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Pakistani Police Arrest Mother on Blasphemy Charges, GLOBAL POST (Sept. 3, 2013, 11:53 
PM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130903/pakistani-police-arrest-mother-blasphemy 
-charges. 
 110. Id. Specifically, Salma was accused of calling herself a prophet of Islam. Id. Highlighting the 
procedural deficiencies of the blasphemy laws, a local police official admitted that although there was 
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Just two weeks later, dozens of Christian families were forced to flee 
from their homes in a village near Lahore after a local pastor, Sattar 
Masih, was accused of blasphemy.
111
 Masih denied the accusations, and 
was called before local Islamic clerics to plead his case.
112
 His accuser, 18-
year-old Ali Hassan, explained the process: “[t]he clerics will decide if he 
blasphemed against our Prophet and in case he refused to appear before 
the clerics then we will kill him.”113 Rather than appear before the clerics, 
Masih fled the village, with several Christian families following suit 
thereafter.
114
  
CONCLUSION 
The Rimsha Masih case was a true outlier on the Pakistani blasphemy 
law landscape, a perfect storm of oddity—an underage, mentally deficient 
girl whose guilt was in serious doubt from the outset and whose plight 
attracted intense and continuous international media attention and outrage. 
To be certain, some hope can be taken from the way her case unfolded. 
Politicians and religious leaders speaking out in Rimsha’s defense at all is 
a positive step, as is the court’s willingness to acquit her.  
However, the blasphemy law system of administering justice is a 
machine that would go of itself, something that does not require political 
or judicial enforcement because it exists outside of the realm of 
democratic law. The uncomfortable combination of democratic rule of law 
and government and Islamicized blasphemy laws in Pakistan has created a 
sizable disconnect between the law enforced by politicians and judges 
(who rely on the rule of law and the democratic process), and the law 
enforced by the masses (who rely on traditional notions of justice derived 
from strict adherence to Islam). The blasphemy laws fall squarely within 
the void between the two; their underlying logic flows from Islamic ideals, 
yet they have been placed within a Western, modern system of law. One of 
 
 
no such claim of prophethood in the pamphlet, the complainant’s accusation was sufficient to prompt 
her arrest. Id. 
 111. Christians Flee Pakistani Village After Pastor Accused of Blasphemy, ALBANY TRIBUNE 
(Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.albanytribune.com/13092013-christians-flee-pakistani-village-after-
pastor-accused-of-blasphemy/. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. The Christian families were prompted to flee when, following the alleged incident, 
“teachers from the village school asked Christian students about the religious teachings Masih had 
been giving them” and then sent 100 of the students home. Id. Although the families have been told by 
local police that there is no risk of an attack on them, they remain reluctant to return. Id. 
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the two systems must necessarily gain the upper hand in determining on 
what terms the blasphemy laws are enforced.  
To date, the law enforced by the masses has decidedly been the victor. 
This has been evidenced by the numerous instances of vigilantism, 
violence, and mob action which have consistently either usurped (by 
delivering “justice” outside of the reach of the courtroom) or dominated 
(by forcing officials to act on accusations) the rule of law in Pakistan. 
This is precisely why, moving forward, landmark acquittals or 
legislative amendments will likely not be enough to achieve true reform in 
regard to the blasphemy laws; the issue is far more deeply rooted. 
Pakistan’s ability to confront its blasphemy law issues will depend upon 
remedying the tensions that exist between its system of governance and its 
foundational religious underpinnings.  
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